I’m done playing the game: between disenchantment, queer solidarity and artist activism at Eurovision 2024

Viewers who saw nothing more of Eurovision 2024 than the grand final broadcast would likely have thought Nemo’s win for Switzerland was putting the troubled contest back on an even keel for 2025. A founding member of Eurovision and the contest’s first host country had earned its first victory since 1988, when the Swiss contestant was a young Céline Dion.

Moreover, Nemo’s status as the first non-binary winner to use they/them pronouns in English seemed to give Eurovision’s cherished Gen Z audience a zeitgeist moment of LGBTQ+ and non-binary representation to match Conchita Wurst’s iconic victory in 2014.

Behind the scenes, though, parts of the contest’s fan culture, and some of the very artists who give over their creativity, stories and performance personas for Eurovision to leverage into what is supposed to be its inspiring atmosphere of diversity, have gone through something closer to Gen Z’s Harry Potter moment during the past Eurovision season – a moment where fans who believed in, and found community through, a pop-culture property’s progressive values have had to confront evidence that its creator does not share those values after all.

Welcome to the show, let everybody know

Many lifelong Eurovision fans who are also committed to resisting so-called ‘artwashing’ and ‘pinkwashing’ practices by the Israeli state, often as a political commitment they draw from their own queer identities, have concluded there is ‘no moral and ethical way’ to engage with Eurovision this year, or potentially in future, while Israel’s broadcaster continues to take part.

The European Broadcasting Union’s quick, though still not instant, decision to suspend Russia from competing in Eurovision 2022 after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine raised hopes that the EBU would act similarly towards broadcasters from other states whose military operations targeted civilians on such a scale. Israel’s, and Azerbaijan’s, continued participation in 2024 showed this would not always be the case, creating pervasive perceptions of a double standard which have driven the narrative of this year’s boycott campaign.  

The Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel’s call for a boycott of Eurovision 2024, issued on the same evening that the queer Palestinian musician Bashar Murad narrowly missed being selected to represent Iceland this year, made some fans cut ties with this year’s contest immediately and left others reconsidering whether to watch or attend right up until the final night.

However, no Eurovision contestant who shared commitments to solidarity with Palestine was ultimately able to break whatever contractual obligations their broadcasters had placed on them in order to boycott the event – raising questions about their material working conditions that still can’t be answered without much more transparency from broadcasters or much more assiduous investigative journalism.

Nemo and eight other artists – Olly Alexander (UK), Bambie Thug (Ireland), Gåte (Norway), Iolanda (Portugal), Megara (San Marino), Saba (Denmark), Silvester Belt (Lithuania) and Finland’s Windows95man, plus Belgium’s Mustii who added his signature afterwards – did publish a joint statement at the end of March expressing their discomfort with the Israeli military attack on Gaza, expressing what was likely the very limit of what broadcasters’ legal teams would allow them to say.

(PACBI still rejected their continued participation as a ‘colonial and patronising attitude’, much as it had rejected Hatari’s attempt to engage critically with Eurovision being held in Tel Aviv by choosing to travel there in 2019.)

Once in Malmö, several artists who were attempting to express solidarity with Palestine in whatever coded ways they could slip past the EBU’s increasingly restrictive management of the event – from Iolanda’s keffiyeh-pattern nails and cooperation with Palestinian fashion designers Trashy Clothing, to Bambie Thug’s efforts to call for a ceasefire and a free Palestine in the Ogham script they had painted on to their body – experienced intimidating behaviour from members of the Israeli delegation and abuse in Israeli media.

The EBU disqualified the Netherlands’ Joost Klein, a pre-contest favourite, on the morning of the grand final in response to a complaint by a female production crew member which is now under investigation by Swedish police, but did not take action against Israeli delegation members’ behaviour towards pro-Palestine artists, despite Bambie in particular raising multiple complaints about the behaviour and about transphobic commentary in Israel’s broadcast of their semi-final.

Nemo, Bambie Thug, Iolanda, and Greece’s Marina Satti – who had openly expressed boredom while Israel’s representative Eden Golan was taking questions during their qualifiers’ press conference on the Thursday night – appear to have been the most heavily targeted, and formed a quartet of mutual support who could be seen during the grand final voting sequence celebrating with each other whenever one of their songs received 12 points: Bambie even handed Nemo their own barbed crown (tying into the slogan of their participation, ‘Crown the Witch’) to wear during their winner’s reprise.

Bambie also struck up a friendship with Belt, a young bisexual singer whose dreams of representing his country at Eurovision and sharing a stage with his boyhood hero Olly Alexander turned into a ‘traumatic experience’ in the backstage atmosphere of Malmö 2024 – to the point that, after having to perform immediately after Golan in the grand final and shoulder the burden of redirecting the audience’s emotions back to the rest of the event, he wished ‘it had all ended after the first semi’ instead.

The winning speeches of 2014 and 2024 reveal something very different about the atmosphere and position of queer performers in the contest, and growing consciousness of how the event has made use of queer performers since 2014.

Are we unstoppable?

In the aftermath of Russia’s introduction of anti-LGBTQ+ laws and annexation of Crimea in 2013–14, and the beginnings of a rise in ‘anti-gender’ political mobilisation across Europe, Conchita Wurst famously dedicated her win to ‘everyone who believes in a future of peace and freedom. You know who you are. We are unstoppable!’

Nemo’s winning speech , in contrast, pushed back at the EBU’s own management of the event, calling on ‘this competition [to] continue to live up to its promise to stand for dignity and peace everywhere’. They continued to resist the EBU’s tight control over visual symbols during their press conference when asked about the significance of the non-binary flag they had displayed in the green room and the flag parade, following an incident outside the arena where security had confiscated a non-binary flag from a distraught fan.

(As I’ve commented since the 2016 contest, such incidents have the potential to happen as long as organisers fail to brief venue security on the design and significance of pride flags besides the rainbow flag – something that appeared to be handled better in Liverpool in 2023.)

Nemo stated that they too would not have been allowed to display a non-binary flag if the EBU had had its way:

‘That is unbelievable. I had to smuggle my flag in, because Eurovision said no. And I did it anyway, so I hope some other people did that too. But come on, like, how… this is clearly like a double standard. And, as I say, I broke the code, and I broke the trophy. The trophy can be fixed, maybe Eurovision needs a little bit of fixing too.’

Bambie Thug went even further in their comments after the grand final, distinguishing Eurovision as an event from Eurovision as a community created by its artists and fans:

‘behind the scenes you don’t know the amount of pressure and the amount of work that we have been doing to change things. And I am so proud of Nemo for winning. I am so proud that all of us are in the top 10 that have been fighting for this sh*t behind the scenes. Because it has been so hard and it has been so horrible. And I am so proud of us. And I just want to say – we are what the Eurovision is. The EBU is not what the Eurovision is. F*** the EBU. I don’t even care any more. F*** them. The thing that makes this is the contestants, the community behind it, the love and the power and the support of all of us is what is making change, and the world has spoken. The queers are coming. Non-binaries for the f***ing win.’

Their take on Eurovision as a space created by its fan community and artists, not the EBU, could only have emerged in recent years when artists have got to know each other weeks before the event through the pre-party circuit and be able to stay connected online during the buildup in ways that bypass their broadcasters’ message control.

This overlaps with the wider space of fans’ participatory culture or what Jess Carniel has called ‘participatory diplomacy’ – ‘a particular intersection of public diplomacy and participatory culture wherein the audience actively participates in its cultural platform to shape its political message and meaning.’ Artists can interact directly with this community, though – like Eurovision’s own digital workers, who create content without being able to influence policy – they can also become targets of campaigning behaviour which piles up into abuse.

Spread the news, I’m gonna take the fight

As young queer Europeans with attachments to Eurovision, artists like Bambie Thug and Nemo would have been going through a Harry Potter-like process of reconsidering what the event meant to them in the climate since 7 October even if they had not been taking part: Bambie, for their part, has said outright they would have boycotted if they had not become the Irish act (and more than 400 artists supporting the Ireland Palestine Solidarity Campaign called for them to do so anyway). As artists, they each chose not to withdraw or were unable to.

In Malmö, each then went through a second process of disenchantment as artists, discovering what the backstage environment would be like for them as artists who had expressed solidarity with Palestine and finding out that the EBU would not protect their wellbeing as fervently as it has tried to insulate Israel’s broadcaster from any representation of Palestinian symbols on screen – including the censure issued to Swedish Eurovision representative and host Eric Saade, who is of Palestinian descent, for wearing his father’s own keffiyeh around his hand during the first semi-final’s opening act.

Throughout the spring of 2024, the rehearsal period, and even more so once live broadcasts had begun, a mood of disenchantment and divestment from Eurovision as an object of fandom sprung up among politically engaged fans, in which each new incident could bring more fans to switch off.

For some it was the censure of Saade’s keffiyeh. For others it was an overtly transphobic joke in the Swedish semi-final (likely even more wounding than the transphobia-by-omission of a line about men not having breasts in the 2013 interval act), the amount of jokes about apoliticality and peace in the presenters’ script, or Klein’s disqualification. This latter, separate crisis fused with the complaints of the pro-Palestinian quartet to provoke Bambie, Nemo, Satti, and the French entrant Slimane into various acts of dissent in the grand final dress rehearsal, though they did not repeat these on grand final night.

While the Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign predominantly speaks of economic divestment – that is, companies and public institutions such as universities ceasing to invest in Israeli firms – it is emotional divestment among fans which has potential to do the most harm to Eurovision in the long term.

Avada kedavra, I speak to destroy

The Harry Potter franchise’s example represents a telling parallel of a worst-case scenario for Eurovision’s image both because of the significance of social justice and LGBTQ+ causes in the growth of its fandom, and because it is more than just a parallel: some fans will now have experienced this process with both fandoms in the past several years.

Indeed, even parts of Bambie Thug’s Eurovision entry – with its opening line ‘Avada Kedavra, I speak to destroy’ and their outfit reveal incorporating trans flag colours – have been interpreted as commenting on this background.

Since 2017–18, JK Rowling’s expression of what are now her well-known views on trans people in society have dramatically reshaped how many fans who were attracted to the queer-affirming atmosphere of Harry Potter fandom feel they can relate to the franchise or even ended their investment in it altogether.

To fans who have been on this journey of disenchantment, seeing another person wearing a Gryffindor scarf or Hogwarts merchandise no longer means recognising someone with whom you share a fan identity: now it means realising the other person either does not know the symbol’s further meanings or has chosen to ignore them.

Similar emotional divestment from Eurovision among queer fans with anticolonial political commitments was already visible in the run-up to Eurovision 2024 and would likely have become even greater in the event that Israel’s entry had won – an issue that will not disappear in 2025 now that the BDS movement is calling for supporters ‘to boycott all future editions of Eurovision until Israel is banned.’

A further impact of emotional divestment from an event like Eurovision which, unlike a franchise based on works by a single author, depends on musicians and creative teams from almost 40 countries producing new content every year is its capacity to damage what would have been potential artists’ aspirations to follow their love of the event and the role models it has shown them into the dream of actually taking part.

Like other large-scale cultural and sporting events, especially those which heavily invest in messages of diversity as a unifying force for their participants and fans, Eurovision aims to create a charged atmosphere of identification with its values throughout its physical and virtual spaces which makes the experience exhilarating and sets it apart from everyday life.

Critical geographers such as Angharad Closs Stephens argue these ‘affective atmospheres’ – like the party atmosphere of the London 2012 Olympics/Paralympics and their narratives of a racially and sexually diverse Britain – also have a disciplining effect which makes it uncomfortable to express dissent in the middle of upsurges of collective emotions like pride.

At the same time, they allow for the possibility that feelings moving through crowds at intense moments can also produce ‘unpredictable’ expressions of detachment as well as attachment, such as the booing of the then UK Chancellor of the Exchequer at the 2012 Paralympics in protest at his government’s cuts to disability benefits – or the booing of contest executive supervisor Martin Österdahl during this year’s grand final when he tried to make his traditional announcement that the booing was ‘good to go’.

You’re good to go

Artists performing in Eurovision are the raw material of each contest’s affective atmosphere. The event and its management need fans and more casual viewers alike to invest in and identify with their favourites, to support one over another, to vote for them and bring in revenue, to perform their own support for them as live audience members, to drive a thrilling voting sequence with their preferences, and to choose one as a winner who will become part of the contest’s heritage and meaning, not to mention deciding the politics of location for the following year’s event.

Each host broadcaster’s producers frame a narrative of the event, host city and host country around the artists, and strive or should strive to present each artist in what they see as the best possible way, but do not determine what the artists and their creative teams contribute.

To understand artists’ situation within these atmospheres, however, we also need to understand the politics of emotion inside workplaces and institutions which depend on workers’ personal investments and passions for what those organisations are supposed to do, then all too often ostracise or punish those who reveal their hypocrisies or complain.

These dynamics are another fact of what Lauren Berlant called ‘cruel optimism’, the unrequited hope that contemporary cultural politics and the economy encourages us to place in objects of desire that will never structurally be able to deliver what we expect of them, which I started relating to Eurovision before this year’s grand final in my last blog post here. They are pervasive across the creative industries, education, activism and media, which all harness and consume workers’ passion, but at Eurovision must be particularly febrile because of the intensity of the production ‘bubble’.

On a greater scale than ever before, artists in this year’s competition have taken the beginnings of collective action against the impact on their wellbeing that taking part in Eurovision has had, while past artists such as Montaigne, Mae Muller and La Zarra have also spoken out about artists’ wellbeing and the impact of the EBU continuing to include Israel’s broadcaster.

News of artists’ collective dissent in the 36 hours before Nemo’s win might temporarily have felt restorative, proving Joanna Holman’s recent point that artists in today’s world of direct access to fans through social media, and indeed fans who create or discuss their own content, can no longer be expected to passively accept the event organisers’ narratives about what Eurovision means when they perceive that it is not living up to its own values. From such shared workplace experiences are labour movements made.

The numbers of active fans who will hear of these actions are, however, just a fraction of the broader mass of viewers, who will only witness the relations between artists through what takes place on camera and is allowed to be shown in the Eurovision broadcast.

Let me taste the lows and highs

This wider audience would not know, unless their own broadcaster’s commentators told them, that Bambie Thug missed their appearance in the dress rehearsal grand final due to the complaints about Israeli TV’s commentary they were having to put into the EBU, that Slimane abandoned his set-piece a cappella moment in that same rehearsal to make a statement calling for peace, or that last year’s Norwegian and Finnish Eurovision representatives, Alessandra and Käärijä, refused to act as spokespeople for their national jury votes after Klein’s disqualification.

Alessandra, indeed, stated on Instagram she had decided to withdraw because Eurovision’s new ‘United by Music’ motto had become ‘just empty words’:

‘There is a genocide going on and I’m asking you all to please open up your eyes, open up your heart. Let love lead you to the truth. It’s right in front of you. Free Palestine.’

The bonds of friendship in adversity forged between pro-Palestine artists at Eurovision this year resulted in unprecedented images of mutual support on camera when the quartet of Nemo, Bambie Thug, Iolanda and Marina Satti each received their points.

And yet, in what was screened at Eurovision 2024, the friendships between these four artists and 14th-placed Silvester Belt will just have resembled the same good cultural relations story that the UK’s Sam Ryder and Ukraine’s Kalush Orchestra could tell in 2022 after getting to know each other in Turin, in a context around which Eurovision’s key stakeholders had much more consensus.

Before this year’s contest, I questioned whether politically engaged queer artists would still want to take part in Eurovision after 2024, or would still want to allow lyrics and looks expressing their own intimately personal stories – like Nemo’s winning song – become the face of a ‘Europe’ which protestors have charged with turning a blind eye to genocide.

What contingently appeared instead was a spark of collective action among a group of predominantly queer, pro-Palestine artists who have expressed a distinction between ‘Eurovision’ as an event controlled by producers and the EBU, and ‘Eurovision’ as the community that has grown up around it by identifying with the values it encouraged them to feel good about.

Yet the ‘Europe’ affirmed by Eurovision’s votes in 2024 was one where multiple queer and trans identities of performers in different European countries, from Ireland to Lithuania, were welcomed – and Nemo was not censured for displaying their non-binary flag in the opening flag parade – while the EBU and Swedish television had simultaneously been ruling that symbols of Palestinian heritage were unacceptably political.

When the EBU and host broadcaster have the monopoly on what will be included within the broadcast ‘text’ of each contest, it is questionable what level of collective action among artists short of outright mass withdrawal can produce meaningful change within an organisation that can only make high-level policy with consensus among its member broadcasters, who are in turn accountable to their states’ governments, and which has been very effective at harnessing emotions of love, joy, friendship and solidarity to build up the atmospheres of this commercial event. These atmospheres are as exhilarating and enticing as they are mechanisms of discipline.

And at the heart of this struggle remain the questions about Eurovision, queer identities and the multiculturalism of Europe which have needed to be discussed ever since Eurovision 2014, in the aftermath of the Sochi Winter Olympics, launched Conchita as a symbol of a liberal, tolerant Europe and relaunched Eurovision as a space where affirmation for sexual and gender non-conformity reigns.

European queer of colour critique, such as the work of Fatima El-Tayeb and Jin Haritaworn, was speaking out against how mainstream western European gay culture has marginalised ways of being queer which are not secular or consumer-oriented ways of being since before Conchita even took the Eurovision stage: Bashar Murad’s entry in this year’s Icelandic final, co-written by the drummer from Hatari, seemed to allude to this very dynamic in his lines about the ‘test’ that a queer Palestinian like himself has to pass in the ‘wild, wild west’ to which the narrator of his song had migrated.

(Had Murad won the final, based on his live performance, Palestinian dabke dancing would have been represented on stage at Eurovision 2024 – from the same country whose representatives held up Palestinian flags during the voting of Eurovision 2019.)

In the liberationist queer politics which both Nemo and Bambie Thug to various extents have identified with, solidarity with Palestine represents a linkage of queer and anti-racist struggles that seeks to defeat ‘pinkwashing’ strategies globally, whether they are implemented by the Israeli state, their own countries’ governments, or wherever else they appear.

Yet the difference between the Conchita moment of 2014 and the Nemo moment of today is that the EBU of 2024 has much more actively promoted Eurovision’s LGBTQ+ significance to boost engagement with Gen Z youth audiences and demonstrate the contest’s social impact, while constraining the expression of any solidarity with Palestine at a time when this too is a significant queer cause. If the EBU’s policymakers do not take further action, it will again be down to fans, potential artists and the contest’s own creative workers to find their ethical way through an event that has much to lose in 2025.

Is there a radical history of Eurovision?

This post originally appeared at History Workshop Online on 10 May 2024.

Radical history and the Eurovision Song Contest might seem an unlikely mix – yet the first protest against a participating country took place less than a decade into Eurovision’s history, when a Danish left-wing activist in the audience of the 1964 Copenhagen contest held up a sign saying ‘Boycott Franco and Salazar’ – then the military dictators of Spain and Portugal.

Some Eurovision participants have come from radical music scenes, especially as the contest’s musical diversity and broadcasters’ appetite to take creative risks has recently grown. Ireland’s 2024 representative Bambie Thug, a non-binary ‘ouija pop’ artist and practising witch, spent time in underground music scenes in east London as well as their hometown Cork.

The Croatian art-punk band Let 3, whose 2023 entry satirised militaristic hypermasculine dictators at a Eurovision which could not be held in the 2022 winning country Ukraine because of Russia’s full-scale invasion, have roots in a radical counterculture that dates back to late socialist Yugoslavia, and had originally developed their song’s concept for an anti-war rock opera inspired by avant-garde productions of Lysistrata and Brecht. They invited Zagreb’s present-day queer underground into their performance by asking radical drag artist Jovanka Broz Titutka to join their visuals.

Performers from scenes which were radical in their own contexts also appear much earlier in Eurovision’s history, often connected to the fall of dictatorships in southern Europe. Mariza Koch, whose 1976 Greek entry famously lamented the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, belonged to a folk music scene that could only exercise its public voice after the Greek junta fell. Portugal’s 1974 entry ‘E depois do adeus’ acquired its radical significance only after Eurovision, when left-wing army officers resisting the Portuguese dictatorship’s colonial wars agreed it was a signal to launch the coup that became the Carnation Revolution. Their other signal song, ‘Grândola, vila morena’ by José Afonso, belonged to a radical culture of political folk song which became the sound of revolutionary Portugal – pastiched a generation later by comedians Homens da Luta, representing Portugal at Eurovision 2011 amid Europe’s financial crisis.

Perhaps the most elaborate radical engagement with Eurovision is still that of the Icelandic anti-capitalist techno-industrial, BDSM-styled band Hatari. Hatari won the right to represent Iceland at Eurovision 2019 in Tel Aviv amid national debate about whether Iceland should take part when Israel had been subject to a cultural boycott campaign by the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) since 2004.

For the previous decade, Eurovision’s LGBTQ+ connections – including Dana International becoming Eurovision’s first openly trans artist and first openly LGBTQ+ winner when representing Israel in 1998 – had increasingly encouraged Israeli state institutions to build the contest into their pro-LGBTQ+ communications strategies. Radical queer activists have termed these ‘pinkwashing’ to convey how they argue these narratives aim to deflect international public attention from the state’s repression of Palestinians.

Before travelling to Tel Aviv, Hatari connected with queer Palestinian musician Bashar Murad to discuss their participation. Contest rules constrained how far they could speak out until after Eurovision, and the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), which organises Eurovision, censured them for calling what they had seen in Israel ‘apartheid’. During their stay they had visited occupied Palestinian territory in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, met Murad, and obtained Palestinian flag banners that they displayed live during the grand final’s voting sequence – though PACBI criticised their acts as ‘fig-leaf gestures of solidarity’ after having crossed a ‘Palestinian boycott picket line’.

Hatari’s friendship with Murad became a lasting collaboration, and their drummer Einar Hrafn Stefánsson co-wrote Murad’s song ‘Wild West’ for Iceland’s national selection in 2024, with overtones of queer Palestinian diasporic resistance. By then, Hamas had committed the attacks of 7 October 2023 against Israeli targets including a music festival, and the Israeli military had retaliated with such disproportionate force against civilian life in Gaza that the International Court of Justice ruled on 26 January 2024 that the Israeli state was at ‘plausible’ risk of committing genocide. PACBI called a boycott of Eurovision 2024 on the same evening Murad narrowly lost the Icelandic final.

A radical history of Eurovision would take in performers and performances like these, but would not confine itself to them. Radical history, as Onni Gust has written, has concerned itself with the lives of people and communities ‘marginalized in the official record’, with systems of oppression and people’s struggle against them, and with the conditions in which these histories are produced. These conditions demand radical inquiry.

Eurovision is a liberal structure, not a radical one. It is with the language of liberal inclusion that today’s EBU takes pride in its flagship event’s association with LGBTQ+ rights: its annual Eurovision brand impact report praises Eurovision for ‘boosting acceptance’ of LGBTQ+ people throughout Europe, symbolised by public votes affirming famous LGBTQ+ winners like Dana International and 2014’s Conchita Wurst. The event’s stated values are universality, diversity, equality, inclusivity and the ‘proud tradition of celebrating diversity through music’. Radical perspectives on liberal visions of ‘Europe’ critique all of these.

Indeed, performance scholar Katrin Sieg argues that twenty-first-century Eurovision has been structured by a neoliberal politics of cosmopolitan representation, where central and east Europeans yearn to be recognised as equally European by the West and musicians from racialised minorities are put front of stage to showcase nations’ inclusivity while obscuring more difficult politics of racial and ethnic difference at home.

Participating artists often test the boundaries of what they can do and say while contractually linked to the event, in ways which are sometimes more politicised (could Portugal’s Salvador Sobral wear a ‘SOS Refugees’ sweatshirt at Eurovision press conferences in 2017? Could Hatari release their first collaboration with Murad while the Tel Aviv contest was still going on?) and sometimes less (could Finnish musicians show viewers a middle finger or simulate nakedness on stage?).

The EBU as contest organiser still unilaterally delimits these boundaries, on pain of sanctions for broadcasters that break contest rules. Broadcasters transfer these to artists through contractual obligations, and it has been speculated one reason why artists who have expressed discomfort about competing in 2024 while Israel takes part – including Bambie Thug, the UK’s Olly Alexander, and several other queer artists – have not withdrawn is the financial penalty they would face.

In the midst of Black radicalism, revolutionary Marxism, anti-Vietnam War protest and FBI repression in the late 1960s USA, Howard Zinn offered five ways in which history could be useful for radical change:
to sharpen our perception of ‘how bad things are, for the victims of the world’;
to expose governments’ pretensions ‘to either neutrality or beneficence’, and ‘the ideology that pervades our culture’;
to ‘recapture those few moments in the past which show the possibility of a better way of life than that which has dominated the earth thus far’;
and ‘to show how good social movements can go wrong, how leaders can betray their followers, how rebels can become bureaucrats, how ideals can become frozen and reified’.

A radical history of Eurovision like this would need to demonstrate how its liberal principles have obscured other marginalities, as critical scholars and content creators are already doing. It would also look beyond performance content and public discourse to explore the contest’s material power relations, including the situations of low-paid production, catering, cleaning and security workers whose labour has always been necessary to stage the contest and whose numbers have rocketed with Eurovision’s transformation into an arena event.

These material power relations extend to the event’s consequences for host cities and their residents: critical scholars of the Olympics, a much larger mega-event, have said much more on this, and on host states’ deflection of negative publicity through what Jules Boykoff calls ‘sportswashing’.

The most dramatic negative impact of Eurovision for a host city may still be the eviction of hundreds of Baku apartment-dwellers before Eurovision 2012 so that Ilham Aliyev’s regime could advance its alleged sportwashing ambitions by constructing a new arena. While Eurovision can bring many positive impacts for host cities, as it appeared to for Liverpool in 2023, we should not assume all impacts are positive, but should seek evidence. What for instance changed, if anything, for queer inhabitants of cities like Belgrade in 2008 where queer visibility and safety were pulled into the spotlight by hosting Eurovision, and were those changes for the better?

A radical history of Eurovision would also need to be a radical history of public broadcasting in Europe, the ideologies it has naturalised, and its relations to state, nation, and public, and indeed to private capital as many states’ support of public broadcasting has hollowed out – particularly those hit harder by financial crisis in central and Eastern Europe, like Bosnia-Herzegovina which has not competed since 2016. Corporate sponsorship is now crucial to Eurovision, adding an almost unexamined set of actors into its power relationships. A radical history of Eurovision would therefore expose the fiction upheld by the EBU that the international song contest can be apolitical, as necessary as that fiction might be for cultural relations activity to occur.

At the same time, it would search for ‘moments which show the possibility of a better way of life’ beyond state violence, anti-queer sentiment, and the suppression of radical performance and speech. Eurovision once appeared to be one of those spaces, when Peter Rehberg wrote in 2007, the year of Marija Šerifović’s queer-coded victory for Serbia, of how rare it was to see ‘both queerness and national identity’ celebrated at the same time. This is still powerful in conditions of repression and censorship, but is also more open to co-option than when Rehberg wrote.

Alternatives to Eurovision imagined during the boycott years of 2019 and 2024 reveal further moments searching for better possible ways of life, even though they reached only a fraction of Eurovision’s audience. The 2019 EuroNoize project, featuring underground and DIY bands from 11 European countries, aimed to critically examine the assumptions about Europe, politics and international competition underpinning Eurovision. Its greenroom host reflected afterwards that being able to freely discuss political topics with the participants made her realise how much she had been constrained by Eurovision’s rules when interviewing contestants there.

Palestinian, Israeli and international musicians boycotting Eurovision 2019, including Murad, livestreamed a Globalvision festival on the night of the Eurovision grand final, with performances in Bethlehem’s Aida refugee camp, Haifa, London and Dublin. This year, protesters in Malmö are similarly planning ‘FalastinVision – the Genocide Free Song Contest’ on grand final night, where Murad is again expected to perform.

Alternative Eurovision events are also taking place beyond Malmö. In Ireland, for instance, ‘Shine On Palestine: the Alternative Eurovision’ will take place the night before the grand final in Galway and Dublin. Dublin drag queen Panti Bliss, whose viral speech against homophobia rocked Ireland in the same year that Conchita won Eurovision, will MC the Dublin event, and her Pantibar ‘sadly’ will not screen Eurovision 2024, indicating how the contest’s sexual politics have shifted since 2014.

Though different in format, all these projects have aimed to create alternative experiences that protest contemporary Eurovision but operate with some of the same emotional affordances of international musical competition/co-performance that drew many viewers to the event. Each project hints at a gap between the values Eurovision has claimed and the realities of its contemporary politics, which alienated some politically engaged fans in 2019 and more in 2024. While it is anachronistic to see Eurovision as always having had a progressive social mission, a myth of its progressive impact has still developed around it. For some who have loved Eurovision with a sense of social justice that also calls them towards solidarity with Palestinians, that myth is now on the brink of becoming another of Zinn’s good causes ‘gone wrong’. The outcomes and alternatives of any continued boycott campaign will become part of its future radical history.

Don’t cry, just dance: Baby Lasagna, Croatian folklore politics, and the cruel optimism of Eurovision

Until Baby Lasagna’s folk-techno breakthrough ‘Rim tim tagi dim’ leapt to the top of this year’s Eurovision odds, Croatia had never been among the Eurovision favourites since Doris Dragović’s ‘Marija Magdalena’ in 1999 – when Baby Lasagna was only two years old, Ukraine had not even begun to compete, and some members of Måneskin had not even been born. 

Back in 1999, Croatia recording a first Eurovision win as an independent country would have seemed only a matter of time. Most of Yugoslavia’s nostalgically remembered light pop entries from the 1980s, including Dragović’s first Eurovision appearance in 1986 and Yugoslavia’s only winning song in 1989, had come from the Zagreb studio of Yugoslavia’s federal public broadcaster.

Zagreb hosted Eurovision 1990, with Tajči’s legendary home entry ‘Hajde da ludujemo’, days before the pro-independence Croatian Democratic Union would win multiparty elections, and weeks before RTV Zagreb would transform into Croatian Radio-Television (HRT), with the mission of promoting a Westernised, central European identity for the nation and separating from Yugoslav culture for good.

After making its independent Eurovision debut in 1993, Croatia took six top ten places in seven years between 1995 and 2001 – and then never again.

Where did it all go wrong?

As late as 2005–6 when established stars Boris Novković and Severina tried to mine the vein of Eurovision’s passion for ethnopop, Croatia could still expect to place just below the top ten (Novković came 11th, Severina 12th). Croatia’s next entry failed to qualify from the semi-final, the two next entries came 21st and 18th, and between 2010 and 2022 a dismal qualification record saw only two Croatian entries, in 2016–17, reach the grand final at all.

The broadcaster which had been so keen to join Eurovision in 1992 that it organised sovereign Croatia’s first national preselection before its European Broadcasting Union membership was even complete even skipped the contest altogether in 2014–15, after its attempt to celebrate the addition of traditional Dalmatian klapa singing to UNESCO’s intangible cultural heritage list with a hastily-assembled klapa supergroup and tourist-trap video, ‘Mižerja’, fell flat in 2013.

Albina’s uptempo ‘Tick Tock’ failing to qualify in 2021, despite high hopes, seemed to set off a much deeper sense of ‘shock, anger and grief’ among a disappointed public over what had become of Croatia’s 1990s independence dream.

Public finance problems, corruption, HRT management priorities, and the relatively lower stakes of being able to influence international perceptions of the nation through Eurovision once Croatia had EU membership in hand are all part of the story of Croatia’s Eurovision decline.

The tameness and Westernness of most of the songs even selected internally or chosen for HRT’s national final, Dora, since 2007 also suggests, however, an institutional fear of unleashing the kind of scandal Severina’s ‘Moja štikla’ caused in 2006 when her cheeky repackaging of folklore from the Dinaric highlands represented Croatia by combining her risqué humour with the most ‘Balkan’ of the folk traditions on the nation’s diverse cultural map.

HRT’s choice to allow Let 3 – who have played with that same folklore – to spin off a concept from their antimilitarist rock opera project into a Dora entry in 2023, then to give the veteran art-punk band the licence to transfer its satire of warmongering dictators to Eurovision with minimal changes, showed that creative risk was back on the menu, and earned Croatia its first grand final place since 2017.

Even then, producers did not originally choose ‘Rim tim tagi dim’ for Dora: the song that won such a landslide public vote from Croatian viewers that it scored more points than the other 15 finalists combined only moved up from HRT’s reserve list when another participant pulled out. Besides the anxious everyman of his performance or his back story as a metal guitarist going solo, Baby Lasagna’s persona is now also that of an underdog hero triumphing over corruption at the national broadcaster – what might in other circumstances be the plot of a post-Yugoslav Croatian film.

‘Rim tim tagi dim’ becoming so strong a favourite for Eurovision that Zagreb is among the European cities reserving their arenas for next May is ‘Moja štikla’’s revenge: proof that creative play with folklore, scaled up to the spectacle level that contemporary Eurovision demands, can put Croatian entries back into contention, and that the lode has been sitting there untapped all this while.

In the shadows

Marko Purišić, who took the name Baby Lasagna after leaving the folk metal band Manntra to start a solo career, comes from Umag on the tip of Croatia’s Istrian peninsula, almost the northernmost town before the Slovenian border and the still mildly contested Gulf of Piran.

Istria and the adjacent Gulf of Kvarner, where Let 3’s home town Rijeka is the largest city, both take pride in a cosmopolitan, multilingual identity which has often put the region at odds with homogenising patriotism at national level – and have now produced the two most talked-about Croatian Eurovision entries in years.

Manntra formed in Umag as teenagers, joining a list of musicians from the town which also includes Eurodance band Karma and the singer-songwriter Alka Vuica, whose kitsch image made her unusually able to explore Croatia’s Balkan hang-ups – and hint at sapphic relationships – in the mid-1990s’ and early 2000s’ Croatian pop scene. (The city council booked Vuica and Karma to make a summer dance video showing off Umag’s beach tourism in 2015.)

Except when the privately-owned Stella Maris resort plays host to the Sea Star electronic music festival or the Croatia Open tennis championships, Umag is somewhat off the map of Croatia’s headline tourist destinations. The hill towns and villages of inland Istria are even more so, though a regional ecotourism strategy aims to change that.

The 3.4 million views already gathered for the official video of ‘Rim tim tagi dim’, filmed in the Umag countryside, are a promotional opportunity for Umag’s own brand that city leaders couldn’t fail to engage with: the city council and tourist board are even contributing to the logistical costs of Baby Lasagna’s performance in Malmö ‘so that Umag and Croatia will be represented in the “world” as they deserve.’

With just two online song releases before ‘Rim tim tagi dim’ to his name since leaving Manntra, Baby Lasagna’s Dora performance was his first as a lead vocalist, and the vulnerability he showed on Instagram and TikTok videos opening up about his confidence struggles immediately endeared him to a fan culture that commonly adores performances of ‘soft masculinity’ in its male idols.

Though only 28, Purišić has had the benefit of a decade’s experience in live music through Manntra, who began finding their way on to the German folk metal scene in 2017 by collaborating with the frontman of medieval metal band In Extremo, and saw their latest album without Purišić enter the German charts in 2023 – a level of exposure beyond the post-Yugoslav region of which many Croatian acts who are better-known at home only dream.

Manntra brought German folk metal style back to Dora in 2019 with their fourth-placed ‘In The Shadows’ (not the last Finnish coincidence in this post), where Purišić is just about visible in a grey tunic on the right:

Baby Lasagna’s folk metal and industrial background carries through into the lighter-hearted vibe of ‘Rim tim tagi dim’, with strong influences of Rammstein, just like 2023’s Finnish Eurovision sensation Käärijä. ‘Rim tim tagi dim’ was always going to be compared to Käärijä’s ‘Cha cha cha’ because of its own driving riffs and its ability to explore both personal vulnerability and an actual social problem beneath hedonistic top-notes, even before Baby Lasagna’s Dora outfit turned out to also feature puffy sleeves – as able to inspire fan art as Käärijä’s green bolero in 2023, but in this case alluding to Istrian folk costume.

Those Rammstein-like riffs, similarly, also have roots in a wellspring of experimentation with local folk tradition by Istrian pop and rock musicians which dates back to the mid-1990s and even had a token presence at Dora but never came close to representing Croatia at Eurovision itself.

Ča, ča, ča, ča-ča-ča-ča

In the fraught cultural politics of mid-1990s Croatia, alternative-minded Istrian pop and rock musicians started affirming their regional identity by singing in their own dialect, creating a movement known as the ‘ča-val’ or ‘ča-wave’ (‘ča’ is the Istrian word for ‘what’, lending its name to the ‘čakavian’ dialect; standard literary Croatian, ‘štokavian’, says ‘što’).

Ča-val bands like Gustafi, from Pula, developed a laid-back musical idiom which expressed what they saw as the region’s mentality and claimed a full place for their own dialect in Croatian rock.

Ča-val overlapped with the ‘etno’ movement, where musicians across Croatia in the mid-1990s started exploring lower-profile regional folk traditions in more serious, authentic ways than mainstream showbusiness or TV folklore shows had been accommodating. The sound eventually crossed over into mainstream pop, with trained ethnomusicologist Lidija Bajuk and TV presenter Ivana Plechinger both presenting songs inspired by music from the northern region of Međimurje in Dora 1997.

Istria’s offerings to the etno movement were its traditional bagpipes (the ‘mih’) and oboe-like ‘sopile’ and ‘roženice’, played to the region’s distinctive six-tone musical scale.

In 1999, songwriter Livio Morosin and revivalist bagpiper Dario Marušić teamed up to record their defining Istrian etno album Bura, tramuntana, named for two winds that buffet the Istrian coast. Their combination of bagpipes, drumming, and electronic beats on one of its most experimental tracks created an effect not too far from ‘Rim tim tagi dim’:

Ča-val even trickled into Dora around 2000–1 in entries by its most chart-friendly representative, Alen Vitasović, and the etno musician / Radio Pula music editor Bruno Krajcar. Showcasing Istrian bagpipes, dialect and scale to various extents, these typically appealed to voters in Istria and Kvarner but failed to resonate across the rest of the nation in the way that Let 3 and Baby Lasagna’s creative engagements with the region’s folklore would go on to do.

Like Let 3’s anti-war message, Baby Lasagna has also managed to speak to a serious social theme – the unprecedented scale of youth emigration which has become an ‘existential’ debate in Croatian society.

I’m going away and I sold my cow

Since the late 19th-century, hundreds of thousands of young men like the protagonist of ‘Rim tim tagi dim’, and smaller numbers of young women, have left impoverished Croatian towns and villages in search of a new life abroad. In the days before mass air travel evoked by Baby Lasagna’s sepia-toned lyrics video, these rite-of-passage journeys often meant decades-long or lifelong separation from the families, communities, crafts and traditions that emigrants were leaving behind.

The farmhouse setting of Baby Lasagna’s official video, filmed near Umag with local residents playing his friends and neighbours, wrapped a cinematic visual identity around the song and established a signature look for his Eurovision persona when it appeared online two days before Dora.

Finishing his last farm chores before a leaving party that becomes increasingly anarchic as night falls, fires are lit and home-made brandy flows, he shares his anxious emotions and his sense of humour with the viewer, rocks out in the barn with a band of metalheads in balaclavas inspired by traditional Istrian lacework (also on UNESCO’s intangible cultural heritage list), and syncs the instantly memeable line ‘Meow, cat, please meow back’ with a second’s clip of him holding a one-eyed ginger cat, knowing exactly what the cat-based attention economy of digital culture will make of that.

The cat is his own cat, the internet will joyously find out. He has three cats. Their videos go on TikTok. The cats now have a children’s picture book.

The visuals on stage when the pyro finale kicks in are neon dancing cats. Of course they are. In Malmö there are supposed to be even more.

According to Croatia’s national statistics bureau, almost 350,000 Croatian citizens left the country between 2013 – the year Croatia joined the EU – and 2022, with sociologists finding that nearly three quarters of all young emigrants in their research were motivated by better salaries, employment prospects, and living standards abroad. Youth emigration on such a scale is widely debated in Croatian society as a crisis that has left villages in the poorest areas depopulated and primary schools closed down because they simply had no children to teach.

‘Rim tim tagi dim’ communicates the contradictory emotions of leaving for a better life abroad, voiced by a singer who could have followed that path himself – like his younger brother, now the drummer in German gothic rock band Mono Inc. – but chose the quiet of small-town life with his fiancée and his cats in a village of 300 people, Kaštelir.

Desiring to grow into maturity and modernity, his character simultaneously understands he is leaving behind the community that gives him his identity, so throws himself into celebrating with them one last time.

The emo angst of his chorus is familiar musical language for anyone who grew up in the same alternative subcultures, but meshes even more creatively with the lived angst of leaving your home to fulfil your dreams, quite possibly for good, because that home has failed to provide what you would have needed to fulfil them there. Under Baby Lasagna’s ‘round of decompress’ sits this collective, as well as personal, tragedy.

Such a predicament will be relatable across all Europe’s peripheries, but hit hardest in the Balkans, worst affected by the European financial crisis since 2007–8 and least well served by what they were promised on joining the EU. Beneath the fiction of Europe ‘uniting through music’ at Eurovision are structural inequalities between West and East which have left many south-east European broadcasters only able to intermittently take part.

Before Romania’s financial relationship with the EBU deteriorated so badly that its 2016 entry was disqualified from the contest at short notice and the broadcaster will not even broadcast Eurovision 2024, its 2015 entrants Voltaj dedicated their song ‘De la capăt’ – with one of Eurovision’s most poignant language switches – to the children left behind by Romanian parents who have seen no alternative to emigrating for work abroad if they want to be able to give their children a better life.

While Voltaj sang from the perspective of a migrant father, losing his own language as he reminds himself why he is away from his child, ‘Rim tim tagi dim’ is a young man’s eye-view of how migration and masculinity have resonated in this part of the world.

Maybe they also know our dance

Wrapped up in Baby Lasagna’s line about ‘those city boys’, ‘all so pretty and so advanced’ – which he has learned to deliver with an ever more camp wrist-flick as his confidence as a frontman has grown – are layers of meaning both inside and outside the song which point to post-Yugoslav masculinities in flux.

In the post-Yugoslav space’s conventional cultural politics of modernity and tradition, urban and rural, which have underpinned so many musical controversies like Severina’s scandal in 2006, the city is where the nation grows up beyond its peasant traditions to become cosmopolitan and European, and leave the Balkans behind: of course ‘they’ won’t want to know ‘our’ dance.

Though leave it until late at night, and – as anthropologists are still discussing – those dances from the village, the more Balkan the better, are where those city boys really go to cast off their modern European inhibitions, let their emotions out, and have their round of decompress. (Istria’s as far from the Balkans as you can get in Croatia, but in this context the village setting will still do.)

Eurovision’s cultural economy since the ethnopop winners of the 2000s further turns the conventional urban/rural cultural politics on its head. When the contest’s very concept as a popular music competition between nations rewards ideas which are simultaneously this contemporary in aesthetic and neotraditional in inspiration, those city boys will want to know our dance, so they can go off and win Eurovision with it.

Unlike the played-utterly-straight sentimentality of ‘Mižerja’, ‘Rim tim tagi dim’ remixes folklore into the kind of creative expression that has driven many of Eurovision’s most successful entries since Jamala and Salvador Sobral’s intimate winning entries in 2016–17: where the personal authenticity of young masculine vulnerability and sensitivity, and a social anxiety with which neurodivergent fans have sensed something in common, meets the collective authenticity of a context that viewers in numerous countries may have lived themselves or witnessed in their migrant parents’ lives.

Since his Dora performance, Baby Lasagna’s journey from Eurovision has become inseparable from the digital fan culture he interacts with and his newfound national celebrity at home. The singer has been invited to advertise Kaufland supermarkets and Madre Badessa spirits (owned by the pop producer Tonči Huljić, composer of Doris’s ‘Marija Magdalena’ and three other Croatian Eurovision entries).

The broadcaster that did not judge ‘Rim tim tagi dim’ strong enough – or maybe judged it too strong – to initially select it for Dora has since coordinated flashmobs in Zagreb, Split, Zadar, Osijek and Umag with hundreds of schoolchildren, cheerleaders, police officers, firefighters, dance troupes and assorted local people performing the song’s dance.

The picture they paint of an often-so-divided nation uniting to celebrate Croatian achievement which, by leading the Eurovision odds, is already world-class is similar to the atmosphere that breaks out when the national football team heads towards the finals of the men’s World Cup, as it has a remarkable tendency to do.

Outspoken footballer Dejan Lovren might have denounced ‘Rim tim tagi dim’ as ‘demonic’ on the night it won Dora, but the Croatian football federation has jumped on the Baby Lasagna bandwagon by sending him a customised team shirt to bring him luck in Malmo. Even Croatia’s former HDZ president Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović – no stranger to a patriotic bandwagon when Croatians do well at international competitions – has voiced her excitement for his song in terms that attempt to fit it into her own interpretation of national unity.

Baby Lasagna travels to Malmö amid more excitement for a Croatian Eurovision entry than he will have been able to remember during his own lifetime, and the strongest chance of winning that Croatia has ever had as an independent country – in fact, probably higher chances than the only Croatian/Yugoslav winners, Riva, had in 1989.

Disunited by music

And yet, this is not a normal Eurovision. The apparent double standard of the EBU expelling Russian broadcasters from the contest in 2022 after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but continuing to allow Israel’s broadcaster to participate despite the devastation Israeli forces have caused to Palestinian life and culture in Gaza since Hamas’s terror attack of 7 October 2023, has seen Eurovision added to the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) list of targets for the first time in a year when the contest has been held outside Israel. (The EBU contends that the Russian and Israeli cases are not to be compared.)

Israeli forces’ new attack on Rafah started on the night of 6 May – last night, as I upload this post– with the Met Gala taking place in New York and with Eurovision week about to begin.

Contestants from ten countries (Baby Lasagna not among them) posted a joint statement in April about their discomfort at taking part in Eurovision in these circumstances, though PACBI still described their statement as a ‘patronising and colonial attitude’ that did not excuse them from ‘complicity in [the] artwashing’ of a ‘live-streamed genocide’.

Activists’ longstanding critique of how Israeli public diplomacy promotes the country as an LGBTQ+-friendly state to appeal to international LGBTQ+ public opinion, or what they call ‘pinkwashing’, means there has been particular pressure on queer artists with links to alternative scenes that advocate for solidarity with Palestine, like the UK’s Olly Alexander and Ireland’s Bambie Thug (who both signed the April statement), to withdraw from a contest in which, in the final reckoning, they may have been contractually compelled to take part. Every contestant in Malmö is entering a very different atmosphere than would have been expected after the highs of Liverpool in 2023 – an event that inspired the EBU to take up the BBC’s slogan ‘United By Music’ as a permanent one for the competition.

On the day of Eurovision’s heads of delegation meeting in Malmö to review and confirm each broadcaster’s performance plans, a public artwork outside Malmö Live event centre bearing that same slogan was defaced with fake blood by local protestors who oppose Eurovision being held in Malmö while Israel’s broadcaster is taking part.

Almost one in five musicians and cultural organisations who were due to be part of the city of Malmö’s cultural programming have pulled out in protest, including Malmö Dance Academy – who stated on Instagram that this was ‘because of the ongoing genocide in Gaza and in the West Bank’ – well-known acts from Sweden’s annual national final like Dotter and the 2024 runners-up Medina, and, reportedly, Malmö Pride, which is now no longer listed as a partner for a performance in the Eurovision fan village by Conchita Wurst that had been publicised only at the beginning of April.  

Both security reasons and the drop in local buy-in seem to have made Malmö scale down its city-based activities, such as cancelling a public stage which should have hosted free performances in Malmö’s designated ‘Eurovision Street’ (remaining performances have moved into the fan village, which is easier to secure), and scaling back the ‘turquoise carpet’ ceremony which produced such dramatic photos from Liverpool’s Walker Art Gallery last year that large brands immediately started contacting Liverpool’s museums service to book the space for advertising shoots.

Eurovision will not take over Malmö as Liverpool was praised for enabling it to do in 2023. The step change in musical creativity it has witnessed in recent years may also be threatened if the more alternative artists like Käärijä or Alexander who have given the event new life become dissuaded from participating, especially should PACBI’s boycott campaign become a standing one.

As the only city likely to meet the EBU’s hosting requirements should Croatia win, Zagreb has reserved the city’s arena for May 2025, and will organise a free public screening of the Eurovision grand final, as would usually only happen for major international sports matches. Just like Malmö, however, Zagreb would not reap the full benefits of hosting Eurovision if a repeat boycott hit the contest, or even if the brand’s image starts to alienate more of its once-faithful visitors and fans.

During the Obama presidency in the USA, the queer cultural theorist Lauren Berlant coined the phrase ‘cruel optimism’ to describe attachments to ideas of ‘the good life’ which cannot be fulfilled but, in our yearning for them, hold us back from what might be fulfilment otherwise.

Berlant’s theory has helped critical and feminist scholars make sense of the paradoxes of economic precarity in situations as diverse, and yet connected, as how young people navigate long-term unemployment in Turkey and why Nepalese Gurkhas wager their future happiness on training to work in militaries and private security companies that still subordinate them in paternalistic, pseudocolonial ways.

Migration as Baby Lasagna frames it is a cruel optimism: attachment to the good life that might be had abroad or in the big city, which might be materially more liveable if the cards fall right, pulls you away from the differently good life at home. But when the institution behind Eurovision as an event cannot, by its nature as an association of public service broadcasters responsible to their governments, deliver on all the hopes for justice that its fandom have projected on to it since at least Conchita Wurst’s apparently historic victory in 2014, feeling attached to Eurovision comes with a cruel optimism of its own.

One last time for all the good times

This post originally appeared at The Eurovisionaries on 3 May 2024.

The first time I ever watched the Eurovision Song Contest, in 1993, three former Yugoslav republics were making their debuts as independent countries, and four other broadcasters had tried to qualify from central and east European states which never entered Eurovision during the Cold War. The Yugoslav Wars had been taking place for two years, a choir from Croatia was praying for peace, and the band from Bosnia-Herzegovina, singing of a citizen-soldier’s defiance in besieged Sarajevo, had to evade sniper fire across Sarajevo’s airport runway three times to reach the qualification round. Waves of applause filled the hall when the Irish orchestra conductor stepped in to introduce Fazla’s song, and when the host finally made contact with Sarajevo’s jury on a whistling phone line. No wonder I’ve always argued Eurovision is political.

Eurovision is probably also the first place I heard popular music in any language besides English (except perhaps for French? – though the first French-language music I remember in the UK charts came from a Céline Dion album in 1995, and by then I would already have heard sixty-odd Eurovision entries, which all still had to be in countries’ official languages until 1999). Whatever the all-powerful Anglo-American cultural industries tried to tell me, Eurovision revealed to me as an English-speaking teenager in the optimistic and internationalist 1990s that the language of anglophone cultural hegemony had no monopoly on emotional expression, and that each language could uniquely convey things English could not.

Languages became my favourite subject as a teenager, and Eurovision which annually demonstrated so many languages in action at once was one of the reasons why. I wouldn’t like to say a lifetime of critical distance towards nationalism and British exceptionalism started when the BBC commentator Terry Wogan interrupted Maja Blagdan’s breathtaking Croatian performance in 1996 (still the joint record-holder for Croatia’s place on the scoreboard), making patronising remarks that I felt expected as a Brit to be in on the joke for, but it can’t have helped me feel included in the national ‘we’.

By the time I left school at the turn of the millennium, I knew I wanted to understand more about why Yugoslavia had broken up when the multinational country I lived in had not, and that I’d need local languages to do it. I practiced what Croatian I could to learn from self-help books using the websites of the first Croatian newspapers to go online, but also the music that Croatia’s marathon Eurovision selections used to open up – hinting at the musical diversity within Croatia as they went.

Even then, when I started a Masters at University College London’s School of Slavonic and East European Studies, and wrote a dissertation on popular music and national identity in Croatia which opened up into a PhD thesis, I never expected to be writing about Eurovision.

Then it turned out Croatian Television – the broadcaster spun out from Yugoslav Radio–Television’s Zagreb studio, which had steered Yugoslavia’s only Eurovision winner through national finals in 1989 – turned out to have been so keen to enter as an independent country in its own right and prove Croatia was now a sovereign state that it held a Eurovision selection in 1992, even before its membership of the European Broadcasting Union had fully gone through.

In 1993 one of Croatia’s top pop producers in 1993, who had composed that 1989 winning song, believed his new song for the national final had been thrown out because its sound mimicking eastern Croatian folk ensembles sounded ‘too Greek’ at a time when state television insisted Croatian cultural identity should link it to the West and central Europe, not the Balkans or the East.

 And in the middle of my PhD, Severina’s participation in 2006, with an entry aiming to repackage regional folklore for an ethnopop-thirsty audience like the 2003-5 Eurovision winners had all managed to do, unleashed what may still be the biggest scandal in Croatia’s Eurovision history through a perfect storm of sexism, anti-Serbian and anti-Balkan sentiment, and cultural anxiety about the place of Croatia’s Dinaric highlands in national culture. (Look closely in her preview video and you may notice some like-minded labelmates from a recent Eurovision stage.)

As part of an interdisciplinary academic blogging and Twitter community in the early 2010s, whatever else I was researching in my day job, I started blogging at least once every May about what Eurovision revealed about some aspect of nationalism and popular culture – be it Western discourses about ‘bloc voting’, nation-branding and mega-events, or the contest’s often-simplistic visions of diversity and multiculturalism.

Ahead of Eurovision 2014, I wrote my first blog essay about LGBTQ+ politics at Eurovision to write up a talk I had given for LGBTQ+ History Month earlier that year, finishing with some critical reflections on the politics of Pride and the efforts of European democracies like Sweden, the host country of 2013, to look progressive through trumpeting their advances on LGBTQ+ rights while conditions where queerness intersected with other marginalisations were less secure. The theorist Jasbir Puar had termed this historical conjuncture ‘homonationalism’ in a framework she first applied to US politics after 9/11 and next applied to the pro-LGBTQ+ public diplomacy of the Israeli state as it continued its occupation of Palestine.

As anyone who’s read this far is already likely to know, Conchita Wurst won Eurovision 2014 on what she dedicated as a landmark night for all those ‘who believe in a world of peace and freedom’, a few months after the Sochi Winter Olympics and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. My follow-up post about the geopolitical imaginations woven around Conchita’s win influenced one of the main theoretical illustrations in Cynthia Weber’s ground-breaking work on queer international relations theory, and became the second half of an article on Eurovision’s LGBTQ+ politics in European Journal of International Relations that has been cited by dozens of researchers interested in homonationalism, Swedish militarism, or cultural events’ rainbow branding as well as the contest itself.

With international eyes on a bearded Austrian drag queen, colleagues in south-east European studies at the University of Graz invited me to edit a special section of their journal Contemporary Southeastern Europe on ‘Gender and Geopolitics in the Eurovision Song Contest’. As I’ve tried to do in my own work, the line-up brought together established and emerging currents of Eurovision research – an article from Paul Jordan about his research on Ukrainian entries, and possibly the first Eurovision article from another contributor to this blog series, Jess Carniel – with work by scholars who do not usually work on Eurovision but supply important critical frameworks.

Neven Andjelić’s article on the history of that debut Bosnian entry in 1993 drew from the understanding of Bosnian politics on the eve of war he had gained as part of the same generation of young Bosnian journalists as the TV producers who made Fazla’s entry a reality, while Andrej Ulbricht, Indraneel Sircar and Koen Slootmaeckers teamed up to contrast Anglo-German discourses about Marija Šerifović’s Eurovision win versus Conchita’s to ask what had changed in European sexual politics between 2007 and 2014; I continue to use Koen’s critical work on Pride in Serbia in thinking through the LGBTQ+ politics of Eurovision in city space.

Now that I write academic publications regularly about on Eurovision and its relationships of national, European and LGBTQ+ identity, I’ve found myself part of a mini-generation of queer British cultural workers who grew up watching the contest during its public ‘coming out’ in 1997-8 – when the first openly LGBTQ+ artists took part – and have since had the opportunity to engage with the event as professionals. In my case, that included leading a research study on the cultural relations and soft power of Eurovision for the British Council in 2023 when Liverpool hosted the event on Ukraine’s behalf.

Speaking to Steve Holden, who also hosts the official Eurovision podcast, for a Virgin Radio Pride special on Eurovision in 2022, I was conscious how similar in age we and some other guests must all have been when we had formative experiences with Eurovision that tied into what it was like growing up queer at a time when rights we never expected to have were just opening up.

Eurovision research events are typically cheerful affairs, where participants joke with famous song titles and exchange tropes which affirm participation in a shared fan culture; more than once I’ve logged on to a Zoom workshop and announced, ‘Hello, this is Hull calling.’ The hybrid roundtable I joined at Helsinki last month, on the other hand, had a much more sombre atmosphere.

‘Anti-pinkwashing’ activism protesting against how Israeli public diplomacy has appealed to LGBTQ+ public opinion had a latent critique of Eurovision through the 2010s as a space where Israeli institutions’ destination marketing could build on the broadcaster’s selection of upbeat LGBTQ+-friendly entries and the memory of Dana International’s historic Eurovision win as an openly trans woman. It opposed the Tel Aviv contest in 2019 outright, when the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) first added Eurovision to its boycott list.

Hatari’s attempt to subvert the event from within by speaking out against the Israeli state’s ‘apartheid’ treatment of Palestinians and cooperating to platform queer Palestinian musician Bashar Murad was constrained by EBU pressure, was still condemned by PACBI for breaking the boycott, and revealed more directly than ever before how the Eurovision bubble limits artists’ political action.

Eurovision is now a PACBI boycott target again, in protest at the devastating scale with which Israeli forces have retaliated against Gaza since Hamas’s terror attack of 7 October 2023. Although the International Court of Justice ruled in January 2024 that the Israeli state must take measures to prevent any act of genocide against Palestinians, the operations in Gaza continue, with more than 34,000 Palestinians dead, 1.7 million displaced, and no university left standing.

The EBU’s expulsion of Russian broadcasters in 2022 after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine raised hopes that Eurovision would react more actively to large-scale human rights violations by other states which an association of public service broadcasters accountable to their own governments turns out to be unable to fulfil.

In 2023, even the Eurovision live shows could allude to Russia’s attack on Ukrainians and their culture, and artists in Liverpool City Council’s cultural programme had further creative freedom to explore the context of war – including in the Eurovision fan village when Jamala premiered her new album QIRIM. Equivalent emotions of Palestinian grief and resilience in 2024 must either stay outside the bounds of, or exist in direct opposition to, the event atmosphere.

For all the creativity this year’s event is due to contain and all the queer celebration it should have produced, it will not be a space of joy for those who believe that a moral duty to boycott institutions from a state committing unjust acts on such a scale should have outweighed Eurovision’s business as usual, as it did when Russia was – eventually – excluded in 2022.

Venues including London’s Royal Vauxhall Tavern and Dublin’s Pantibar, which usually stage sold-out Eurovision celebrations, will not be screening it in 2024, while Bournemouth Pride stepped back from a Eurovision theme it had selected in Liverpool’s afterglow after its team concluded they could not stand in solidarity with marginalised communities while endorsing Eurovision this year.

That knowledge alone reshapes my affective relationship to an event I can no longer assume an audience will see as something to enjoy, rather as I might withhold a Harry Potter reference I’d have thought nothing of ten years ago. If I hold a Eurovision activity with a group of students, does it exclude those who for deeply held reasons linked to their identity and values do not feel able to participate? When I write about the contest, who among those to whom I am accountable will I harm with the words I choose? Communicating about Eurovision is not a pastime any more.

And if Croatia is set for that first historic win in three decades of independence, why is the contest taking place in an atmosphere which leaves some of its most fervent fans regretting it had to be this year?